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@PUBLICFORUM: THE ARGUMENT FOR A 
PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS’ SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS 
SARA J. BENSON* 
ABSTRACT 
 
While citizens have historically marched on the streets or protested in 
parks to take advantage of the First Amendment, citizens in the modern 
world have often turned to social media to communicate their ideas and 
concerns to their government representatives. As new spaces for expressive 
activity come to light with the development of technology, courts are tasked 
with determining how to properly analyze government-controlled spaces on 
social media. This Note will examine the various approaches courts have 
taken to analyzing government officials’ social media accounts and will 
argue that Supreme Court precedent and the pluralist theory of democracy 
support subjecting the interactive spaces on government social media 
accounts to public forum analysis in order to limit the government’s ability 
to discriminate based on viewpoint and to provide a cause of action against 
the government when citizens’ speech is suppressed online.  
INTRODUCTION 
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment is one of the strongest 
protections that citizens have to shield their expression of diverse thoughts 
and opinions from government censorship.1 While citizens have historically 
marched on the streets or protested in parks to take advantage of the First 
Amendment, citizens in the modern world have often turned to social media 
to communicate their ideas and concerns to their government 
representatives. The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no 
law… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”2 This language 
 
 
*  Notes Editor, Washington University Jurisprudence Review; J.D. Candidate, Washington 
University School of Law Class of 2020; Member of Washington Univerity First Amendment Clinic; 
B.A. in Communications and Psychology; Minor in Crime and Justice, University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor Class of 2017. Special thanks to Gregory Magarian for aiding me in the development and focus 
of this Note, and Priya Mistry for her continuous support throughout the editing process.  
 1.  Kristine Phillips, ‘Hate speech is not protected by the First Amendment,’ Portland mayor 
says. He’s wrong., WASH. POST (May 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2017/05/30/hate-speech-is-not-protected-by-the-first-amendment-oregon-mayor-says-hes-
wrong/?utm_term=.a6cae6150b1d [https://perma.cc/JF8S-HXRU].  
2.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
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creates a few prerequisites to a free speech cause of action against the 
government. The clause that states “Congress shall make no law” means 
that citizens can only challenge a regulation with the First Amendment if it 
is a regulation the government creates (also known as a “state action”).3 
Citizens have even stronger protections from government censorship in 
spaces that have traditionally been devoted to public expression.4 Spaces 
such as public parks, sidewalks, and thoroughfares have been strongholds 
in our nation’s history as places where those who may not otherwise have 
access to a large audience may preach their message to their community.5 
These spaces came to be known as “public forums,” and the Supreme Court 
determined that if the government is trying to suppress or burden speech in 
one of these spaces, the Court would subject the space to forum analysis: a 
higher level of scrutiny for government restrictions on speech in these 
spaces.6 Additionally, even if a space is not one traditionally used for public 
discourse, it may qualify for forum analysis if it is used for public expression 
and is government owned or controlled.7 Further, a finding that a space is a 
public forum limits the government’s ability to regulate (or discriminate) 
based on the content or viewpoint of speech.8  
If citizens feel that their speech is being unfairly silenced in a space that 
is government owned or controlled, they can ask a court to make a 
determination of whether the space can be subject to forum analysis.9 
 
 
3.  Stephen K. Wirth, Note, State Action, Government Speech, and the Narrowing Spectrum 
of Private, Protected Speech, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 485, 485 (2014) (“Under the state-action doctrine, a 
plaintiff claiming a free- speech-infringement must show some state action in order to trigger 
constitutional protection; the constraints of the First Amendment apply not to private persons but to the 
government.”).  
4.   Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) 
Wherever the title of the streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust 
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the 
streets and public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, 
rights, and liberties of citizens. 
5.   Id. at 515-16. 
6.   Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (restating the 
principle that the state may only enforce a content-based exclusion if the regulation is narrowly tailored 
towards serving a compelling state interest); see also KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
95-815, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (2014). 
7.   Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 556 (2018). The court in 
this case additionally considered the purpose, structure, and intended use of the forum to determine 
whether those factors were consistent with forum analysis. Following this analysis, the court classified 
the type of public forum to determine whether the viewpoint-based exclusions were permissible. Id. at 
570-75. 
8.   RUANE, supra note 6, at 7-8.  
9.  Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 41-45.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/7
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Citizens recently brought attention to the question of whether interactive 
space on government social media accounts constitutes a public forum.10 
After his election, President Donald Trump began blocking citizens from 
his @realDonaldTrump Twitter11 account.12 Blocked13 users sued the 
President, arguing they were unable to access this public forum and were 
being discriminated against based on their viewpoint.14 The Southern 
District of New York, and subsequently the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, were faced with the question of whether these spaces could be 
considered public forums and, accordingly, whether the President could 
discriminate based on viewpoint in these spaces.15 While the plaintiffs 
argued that protecting these spaces was essential for free expression, the 
government argued that government officials had the right under the First 
Amendment to use their social media platforms as personal accounts where 
they may speak freely and associate with whomever they please.16  
This note argues that Supreme Court precedent and pluralist theory17 
provide a strong foundation for finding that the interactive spaces on 
government officials’ social media accounts are sufficiently government 
controlled to constitute private property dedicated to public use. The 
interactive space on government social media accounts should be subject to 
forum analysis in order to limit the government’s ability to discriminate 
based on viewpoint and to provide a cause of action against the government 
when citizens feel that their speech is being suppressed. Forum analysis is 
supported by pluralist theory: a theory based on the understanding that a 
representative government is the backbone of democracy and key to 
 
 
10. VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10141, UPDATE: SIDEWALKS, 
STREETS, AND TWEETS: IS TWITTER A PUBLIC FORUM? 1-2 (2019).  
11.  Twitter is a social media platform where a user can post 280-character “tweets” to their 
personal profile. Each user has a “feed,” created through an algorithm, which compiles the tweets of 
every other user they follow, tweets that the users they follow have “liked” or “retweeted,” and 
promotional tweets from advertisers. If a user has a public account, their tweets, retweets, likes, and 
replies are visible to all other users on the site. When there are multiple replies to one tweet, Twitter 
compiles these and lists them in order as a conversation. Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d 
at 550-52. 
12.  Id. at 553-54. 
13.  Id. at 551-52. Twitter also enables users to block or mute each other. Blocked users cannot 
see or reply to a person who has blocked them from their feed. The blocking user does not see any 
blocked users tweets on their feed and is not notified if a blocked user “mentions” them in a tweet.  
14.  Id. at 549.  
15.  Id.; Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 2019).  
16.  Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 571-72. 
17.  Pluralist theory of democracy is a way of viewing American democracy and politics, 
characterized by the role of interest groups. Under this view, political power within a democracy is 
spread out among different interest groups, and those groups compete with one another to influence 
policy. See infra notes 78, 79.  
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preventing the realization of authoritarian tendencies.  
This note is comprised of three main parts. Part I begins by explaining 
the current public forum doctrine, including the requirements for finding 
that a space is a public forum and the types of forums the Supreme Court 
has enumerated. Further, Part I discusses the government speech doctrine 
and the competing argument that social media platforms should be 
considered spaces for government speech, not public forums. The final 
section of Part I introduces pluralist theory, the theoretical framework 
helpful to understanding why a public forum analysis is better suited to a 
representative democracy than a government speech analysis. Part II 
explores the public forum analysis of Twitter in two factually similar cases 
that resulted in entirely different conclusions: a Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals case where the court found that social media could properly be 
analyzed as a public forum and a federal district court case from Kentucky 
where the court found that government social media accounts should be 
treated as government speech. Part III uses Supreme Court precedent and 
pluralist theory to argue that the interactive spaces created by government 
social media accounts should be analyzed under the public forum doctrine 
to preserve the government’s role as mediator of the interests of the 
citizenry.  
I. PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE, GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE, AND 
PLURALIST THEORY 
A. Public Forum Doctrine 
1. Requirements for Applying the Public Forum Doctrine 
In order to apply the forum doctrine, a court must determine, as a 
threshold matter, that a space is owned or controlled by the government.18 
The Supreme Court frequently requires that the forum must be 
“government-owned property.”19 Alternatively, a court can find that a space 
is a public forum absent legal ownership if it is subject to sufficient 
 
 
18. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985) 
(“[A] speaker must seek access to public property or to private property dedicated to public use to evoke 
First Amendment concerns.”).  
19.  See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 478 (2009); see, e.g., Int’l 
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (discussing property 
that the government “owns and controls”); see, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801 (“[A] speaker must seek 
access to public property or to private property dedicated to public use to evoke First Amendment 
concerns.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/7
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government control.20 The forum doctrine should only be applied when it is 
consistent with the “purpose, structure, and intended use of the space.”21 
Forum analysis is most appropriate in spaces where large numbers of 
speakers can use government property or a government program to 
communicate with the public.22 However, forum analysis should not be 
applied when speech would jeopardize the nature and use of the space or in 
spaces where “the government has broad discretion to make content-based 
judgments in deciding what private speech to make available to the 
public.”23 Forum analysis is not beneficial to these spaces because 
substantial discretion is necessary for the forum to exist and because broad 
public access would force closure of the forum.24 
2. Types of Forums  
As the Supreme Court dealt with cases involving public property, two 
approaches developed about how to properly handle these cases.25 The first, 
known as the incompatibility approach, concerns “whether the proposed 
speech is compatible with [the public property’s] other principal uses.”26 
The Court adopted the incompatibility approach in the 1972 case Grayned 
v. City of Rockford.27 Courts using the incompatibility approach invalidated 
speech restrictions in public spaces based on the unique features of the 
space.28 Courts utilizing this approach asked “whether the manner of 
expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular 
 
 
20.  Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010) (“[T]his Court has employed 
forum analysis to determine when a governmental entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place 
limitations on speech.”).  
21.  Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F.Supp.3d at 565 (2018) (citing Pleasant Grove City, 
555 U.S. at 480).  
22.  Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 478.  
23.  Id.; United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 204 (2003) (plurality opinion).  
24.  Arkansas Ed. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672-74 (1998) (“In the case of 
television broadcasting, however, broad rights of access for outside speakers would be antithetical, as a 
general rule, to the discretion that stations and their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill their journalistic 
purpose and statutory obligations.”); National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585-86 
(1998) (“[I]t would be ‘impossible to have a highly selective grant program without denying money to 
a large amount of constitutionally protected expression.’”) (quoting Finley v. National Endowment for 
the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 685 (1996) (Kleinfeld, J. dissenting)).  
25.  KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 313 (University 
Casebook Series, 6th ed. 2016) [hereinafter SULLIVAN & FELDMAN].  
26.  Id.  
27.  408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
28.  Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 
251 (1974) (noting that the incompatibility approach depends on functional considerations that bring 
“streets, parks, public libraries, and other publicly owned places [all] under the same roof”).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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place at a particular time.”29 However, the Court migrated to the 
“categorical approach” after the 1983 case, Perry Education Association v. 
Perry Local Educators’ Association,30 and that is the approach that will 
guide this note.31 This approach categorizes forums based on their 
individual characteristics and then defines standards of review based on the 
differing classifications.32 This approach has been used to classify public 
property into one of four groups: a “traditional public forum;” a “designated 
public forum;” a “nonpublic forum;” or a “limited public forum.”33 Each of 
these categories has different rules and involves consideration of different 
factors. 
“Traditional” public forums are places “which by long tradition or by 
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.”34 These public 
properties, including public street corners, parks, and thoroughfares, are 
places that have a long tradition of free expression.35 These spaces “have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of 
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”36 Without a well-
documented history37 of dedication to public use, the Court will not classify 
public property as a traditional public forum.38 As such, the Supreme Court 
 
 
29.  Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). Incompatibility could be 
determined based on the degree of interference, where expression would be protected as long as it did 
not preclude the normal use of the property. Incompatibility could also be based on the length of time of 
interference, where the court would protect expression as long as it only interfered with the space’s 
normal use for a brief period. See Edward J. Neveril, Comment, Objective Approaches to the Public 
Forum Doctrine: The First Amendment at the Mercy of Architectural Chicanery, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 
1200 (1995-1996).  
30.  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).  
31.  Neveril, supra note 29, at 1195.  
32.  BRANNON, supra note 10, at 2.  
33.  SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 25, at 335-36.  
34.  Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. 
35.  Stone, supra note 28, at 238. 
36.  Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
37.  See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679-81 
(1992). A well-documented history requires that a space has “immemorially . . . time out of mind” been 
held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity. The Supreme Court noted that a 
traditional public forum is a space that has a “principal purpose” of the “free exchange of ideas.” Id. at 
679 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). In ISKCON, 
the Court found that an airport terminal could not be a traditional public forum because “airport terminals 
have only recently achieved their contemporary size and character.” Id. at 680. Additionally, the lateness 
with which modern air terminals have made their appearance means that it is not possible that they have 
“immemorially . . . time out of mind” been held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive 
activity. Therefore, the tradition of airport activity did not suggest that airports have historically been 
used for speech activity. Spaces that have been found to satisfy the requirement of a traditional public 
forum include streets, parks, and sidewalks.  
38.  ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 680-81 (stating that the Supreme Court has “rejected the view that 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/7
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has been reluctant to expand the classification of “traditional public forum” 
to spaces beyond public streets, parks, and sidewalks.39 
When regulating a traditional public forum, the government can only 
impose content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech.40 
Content-neutral regulations are those that are unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression; they regulate without reference to the speech’s 
substance.41 These content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations must 
pass the O’Brien test to be upheld.42 The O’Brien test involves a level of 
intermediate scrutiny. The government must demonstrate that a regulation 
is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and that “no 
alternative means would more precisely and narrowly” address the 
underlying issue the government is trying to regulate.43 However, if the 
government creates a regulation that differentiates based on the viewpoint 
or content of speech within a public forum, the regulation must pass strict 
scrutiny.44 Courts will only uphold a viewpoint or content-based regulation 
in a traditional public forum if it is necessary to promote a compelling 
government interest and is the least restrictive means available to further the 
interest.45  
The second most protected type of government property is a 
 
 
traditional public forum status extends beyond its historic confines”). 
39.  Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998) (“The Court has 
rejected the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its historic confines.”) (citing 
ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 680-81)).  
40. RUANE, supra note 6, at 7-8 (“The Supreme Court will uphold ‘regulations of the time, 
place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.’”) (quoting Perry 
Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). 
41.  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding a National Park Service regulation that 
prohibited camping, including camping as a form of protest, in certain federal parks); Thomas v. Chi. 
Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002) (upholding a city park-permitting scheme that required an application 
in advance for a gathering of fifty or more people); Heffron v. ISKCON, 449 U.S. 1109 (1981) 
(upholding a rule prohibiting the sale or distribution of merchandise, including written material, in 
parks). Examples of content-neutral regulations that have been upheld include: a National Park Service 
regulation that prohibited camping (including camping as a form of protest) in certain federal parks 
(Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 464 U.S. 1016 (1984)); a city park permitting scheme that 
required an application in advance for gathering of 50 or more people (Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 
U.S. 316 (2002)); a rule prohibiting the sale or distribution of merchandise, including written material, 
in parks (Heffron v. ISKCON, 449 U.S. 1109 (1981)).  
42.  O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77. The O’Brien test states that the regulation must 1.) be within 
the constitutional power of the government to enact, 2.) further an important or substantial government 
interest, 3.) that interest must be unrelated to the suppression of speech, and 4.) prohibit no more speech 
than is essential to further that interest. 
43.  O’Brien, 391 U.S at 381.  
44.  RUANE, supra note 6, at 5.  
45.  Id.  
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“designated public forum,” a nontraditional public forum that the 
government has purposefully opened to the general public for expressive 
activity.46 This category includes places like “municipal theatres and 
meeting rooms at state universities.”47 In order to create this type of public 
forum the government must “intend to make the property ‘generally 
available,’ to a class of speakers.”48 The Court stated that we “look to the 
policy and practice of the government to ascertain whether it intended to 
designate a place as a public forum.”49 Just as in a traditional public forum, 
any content-neutral regulation on speech in one of these spaces must pass 
the O’Brien test, and any content or viewpoint-based regulation must pass 
strict scrutiny.50  
The third category, a “nonpublic forum,” is government property that 
has not traditionally been open to public expression and has not been 
designated as a forum for public communication.51 This is a space that is 
theoretically susceptible to a forum analysis but has not, by tradition or 
designation, become a public forum.52 These types of spaces include jails 
and military bases.53 Speech regulations in nonpublic forums are subject to 
rational basis scrutiny, meaning that they will be upheld as long as they are 
reasonable and are not intended to suppress particular viewpoints.54  
The final category, “limited public forum,” has a more complex 
definition and categorization. In Perry Education Ass’n.,55 a case from 
1982, Justice White implied in a footnote that a “limited public forum” was 
a type of designated public forum, suggesting that the three forum categories 
 
 
46.  Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (1983) (“A second category consists of public property 
which the State has opened up for use by the public as a place for expressive activity.”).  
47. Forums, Legal Information Institute, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/forums [https://perma.cc/7YZT-BU7D].  
48.  Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672 (1998) (quoting Widmar 
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264 (1981)).  
49.  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).  
50.  Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469-70 (2009) (“Government restrictions 
on speech in a designated public forum are subject to the same strict scrutiny as restrictions in a 
traditional public forum.”).  
51.  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802-06.  
52.  Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46.  
53.  See Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (holding that a sheriff could lawfully remove 
protestors from a county jail because the property was closed to the public and removing the protesters 
was necessary for proper security); see also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (holding that a 
regulation prohibiting the discussion and distribution of political expression on a military base was 
constitutional because of the function of a military installation is to train soldiers, rather than provide a 
public forum).  
54.  Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 470 (“In such a forum, a government entity may impose 
restrictions on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.”).  
55.   Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 n.7.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/7
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were “traditional public forum,” “designated public forum,” and “nonpublic 
forum.”56 However, in a more recent Supreme Court case from 2010, 
Christian Legal Society,57 the majority opinion stated in a footnote that the 
public forum classifications included the “traditional public forum,” 
“designated public form,” and “limited public forum.” The Supreme Court 
did not mention the “nonpublic forum.”58 It is unclear at this point whether 
a “limited public forum” is a new category separate from the original three, 
if it has displaced the designated public forum, or if the Court just uses the 
terms nonpublic forum and limited public forum interchangeably.59  
Christian Legal Society,60 the most recent Supreme Court commentary 
on this point, suggested that the latter is the most likely when it stated: 
“[T]he Court has permitted restrictions on access to a limited public 
forum…[w]ith this key caveat: Any access barrier must be reasonable and 
viewpoint neutral.”61 This description of a limited public forum is nearly 
identical to the way Justice O’Connor described a nonpublic forum in 
Cornelius:62 “[c]ontrol over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on 
subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are 
reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint 
neutral.”63 This commentary suggests that the Supreme Court understands 
the terms “limited public forum” and “nonpublic forum” as referring to the 
same types of spaces, and accordingly, this note will use the “nonpublic 
forum” and “limited public forum” categories interchangeably. To 
designate forums that are neither “traditional” nor “designated,” this note 
will utilize the term “nonpublic forum.” 
B. Government Speech Doctrine 
Those opposed to the classification of government social media 
accounts as public forums argue that the social media accounts should be 
classified as spaces for government speech, not as spaces for citizens’ 
expressive activity. The Government Speech Doctrine64 recognizes that 
when the government “is speaking on its own behalf, the First Amendment 
 
 
56.  Id. at 45 n.1 (“A public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use by certain 
groups [e.g. student groups], or for the discussion of certain subjects [e.g., school board business].”).  
57.  Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010).  
58.  Id. at 741 n.11.  
59.  SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 25, at 335-36. 
60.  Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 661, 741 n.11. 
61.  Id. at 679.  
62.  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
63.  Id. at 806.  
64.  Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560-62 (2005). 
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strictures that attend the various types of government-established forums do 
not apply.”65 This doctrine developed from a number of government subsidy 
cases in which the Supreme Court determined that government-funded 
programs enable private actors to speak for the government.66 As such, the 
government was allowed to regulate the content and viewpoint of what the 
private speakers said because those private speakers were essentially being 
paid to deliver the government’s message.67  
For example, in Rust v. Sullivan (1991),68 the Supreme Court allowed a 
regulation prohibiting federally funded family-planning facilities from 
counseling patients on abortion services because the government was 
funding speech on its own behalf, not regulating private speech.69 The 
Supreme Court determined that these types of government-funded programs 
do not require viewpoint neutrality because the government may use its 
funds to promote certain viewpoints over others.70 Therefore, when the 
government speaks to deliver its own message or when the government uses 
private speakers to help deliver a government-controlled message, the 
government speech doctrine applies.71 When the doctrine is applied, it 
allows the government to speak freely for itself in a partisan manner, 
without being required to remain viewpoint-neutral.72  
One difficulty of applying the government speech doctrine is 
determining which speech can properly be categorized as government 
speech. This determination is complicated by the use of private parties to 
convey the government’s message.73 In resolving these questions, the Court 
 
 
65.  Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015). 
66.  See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991); Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 
481; Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562.  
67.  See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 194; Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 481; Johanns, 544 U.S. 
at 562.  
68.  Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.  
69.  Id.  
70.  See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 1934  
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to 
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time 
funding an alternative program . . . . In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the 
basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other. 
Id. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“We 
recognized that when the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own 
it is entitled to say what it wishes.”).  
71.  Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562 (“When, as here, the government sets the overall message to be 
communicated and approves every word that is disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the 
government-speech doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental sources in 
developing specific messages.”).  
72.  Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.  
73.  Legal Information Institute, The Government Speech Doctrine, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/7
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has considered a number of factors to aid in determining when speech can 
be properly analyzed under the government speech doctrine, including 
whether the government exercised “effective control” over the speech; 
whether the government has “final approval authority;” whether the 
government has a history of using the specified platform to speak; and 
whether the public identifies the speech as content from the government.74 
The public forum and government speech doctrines are in tension with 
one another because they provide alternate frameworks for the regulation of 
government social media accounts. Under a public forum analysis, a 
government controlled social media account will be held out as a space for 
expressive activity, and the government actor controlling it cannot exclude 
anyone based on the viewpoint they express in the forum. On the other hand, 
under a government speech analysis, the account itself is a means for the 
government to deliver its own message. Therefore, any “blocking” is the 
government exercising its right to exclude messages it does not want 
associated with its own speech.  
Both the public forum doctrine and government speech doctrine have 
been used to analyze government social media accounts.75 Courts are split 
on whether government officials’ can block citizens from commenting on 
their social media accounts. Therefore, an alternate solution is necessary to 
determine which approach is better suited for the space.76 Specifically, this 
note will look to the pluralist theory of democracy, a political philosophy 
that will provide a framework for understanding the conditions that allow a 
representative democracy to function effectively.77  
  
 
 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/the-government-speech-doctrine 
[https://perma.cc/7SBR-NFFP]. 
74.  See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560-61 (holding the First Amendment does not prohibit 
compelled subsidization of advertisements because the underlying message was “effectively controlled” 
by the government); see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470-73 (2009) (holding 
that permanent monuments on public property that were provided by private parties were government 
speech because the government exercises effective control, has final approval authority, has a long 
history of “us[ing] monuments to speak to the public”); see also Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, 576 US 135 S. Ct. 2230, 2250 (2015) (holding Texas specialty license plate 
designs were properly considered government speech because Texas “effectively controlled” the 
messages conveyed, the Board had “final approval” over each license plate design, and license plates 
are primarily used as a form of government ID, bearing the State’s name).  
75.  BRANNON, supra note 10, at 2, 3.  
76.  See, e.g., Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019) (utilizing 
the public forum analysis); Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018) (utilizing a 
government speech analysis).  
77.  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES J. BRUDNEY, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC 
POLICY 38-39 (West Acad. Pub. 5th ed. 2014).  
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C. Pluralist Democracy 
Pluralist theory of democracy is a way of viewing American democracy 
and politics, characterized by the role of interest groups.78 Under this view, 
political power within a democracy is spread out between different interest 
groups, which compete with one another to influence policy.79 Pluralists 
argue that one of the key characteristics of American democracy is that no 
single interest group dominates the political sphere.80 Strong interest groups 
are key because they “protect individuals against oppressive and tyrannical 
government.”81 American policy is driven by these interest groups, some of 
which have vast resources and are very influential and some of which are 
limited to smaller sects of interest.82 Examples of these organizations 
include “unions, trade and professional associations, environmentalists, 
civil rights activists, business and financial lobbies, and informal coalitions 
of like-minded citizens.”83 Anyone who is able to organize a group and 
create excitement around a common cause has the ability to make a 
difference and influence policy.84 People sort themselves into groups based 
on issues they care about and use their resources to improve that issue.85  
Another key characteristic of pluralism is that the interest groups are 
politically autonomous; politicians and political parties do not control 
them.86 Instead, the amount of influence they have depends on their ability 
to gather resources and gain a following.87 The groups with the most 
influence and largest base are then able to encourage politicians to support 
their causes.88 As these politicians need the support of interest groups to win 
 
 
78.  ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 146 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 
Expanded ed. 1956).  
79.  ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (1968). Dahl uses 
“pluralist democracy” to refer to a democratic government where “[i]instead of a single center of 
sovereign power there [are] . . . multiple centers of power, none of which is or can be wholly sovereign.” 
80.  Id.  
81.  ESKRIDGE ET. AL., supra note 77, at 39.  
82.  Claude J. Burtenshaw, The Political Theory of Pluralist Democracy, 21 WESTERN POL. Q. 
577, 577-78 (1968) 
83.  H.T. Reynolds, Pluralism, American Political System, UNIV. OF DEL.: AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SYSTEM (Jan. 2, 1998), https://www1.udel.edu/htr/Psc105/Texts/pluralism.html 
[https://perma.cc/S7MB-MMWA]. 
84.  Burtenshaw, supra note 82, at 585 (“In contemporary American society, there is no 
considerable concentration of power anywhere; ‘at bottom, nobody dominates.’”).  
85.  Id. 
86.  JOHN F. MANLEY, NEO-PLURALISM: A CLASS ANALYSIS OF PLURALISM I AND II, 77 THE 
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 378 (1983). 
87.  DAHL, supra note 78, at 145 (“I defined the ‘normal’ American political process as one in 
which there is a high probability that an active and legitimate group in the population can make itself 
heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of decision.”).  
88.  Burtenshaw, supra note 82 at 585.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/7
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elections, they are incentivized to advocate for the goals of these interest 
groups in an attempt to maintain their support.89  
Pluralists emphasize the equality of political opportunity that exists in 
the American system, even though they recognize that actual equality is 
lacking.90 Although pluralism recognizes that oppression continues to exist 
under this system, theorists argue there is a floor under it.91 This floor 
operates as a minimum degree of political opportunity for each citizen that 
provides a means for persecuted groups to organize and force the system to 
self-correct.92 Pluralists believe that “[b]y mobilizing resources (collecting 
signatures on a petition, for example), they can make existing groups share 
their influence, or they can create new organizations that will compete with 
established ones.”93 There are always unused resources available, and if a 
new group recognizes that its interests are threatened, this new group can 
come together to take advantage of unused resources to address the 
injustice.94  
In the pluralist system, the government serves as a mediator.95 The 
government may be active in engaging with the democratic system, but it is 
meant to be impartial.96 This system should work in a manner that allows 
the government to compromise and enact solutions based on the desires of 
different interest groups but in a manner that does not allow the government 
to unilaterally create its own “governmental interests” unsupported by the 
citizens.97 When a pluralist system functions properly, it will prevent 
authoritarian governance in which the government maintains its own 
agenda, unsupported by a majority of the population.98  
 
 
89.  Id. (“Leaders have an incentive to meet the wishes of their constituents, and this may cause 
them to reflect popular will.”). 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. 
92.  Id. 
93.  Reynolds, supra note 83. 
94.  Burtenshaw, supra note 82, at 585. For example, in Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), the Supreme Court provided greater latitude for states to restrict access 
to abortion. Because of this, groups of pro-choice individuals banded together because they felt their 
rights being threatened, and aggressively fought to prevent states from enacting laws that would limit 
abortion rights even further.  
95.  STEVEN E. BARKAN, Theories of Power and Society, in SOCIOLOGY: UNDERSTANDING 
AND CHANGING THE SOCIAL WORLD 518, 519 (Comprehensive ed. 2011). 
96.  BARKAN, supra note 95.  
97.  Id. (“[G]overnment as a neutral referee to ensure that the competition among veto groups 
is done fairly, that no group acquires undue influence, and that the needs of the citizenry are kept in 
mind.”). 
98.  Oliver Escobar, Pluralism and Democratic Participation: What Kind of Citizen are 
Citizens Invited to be? 14 CONTEMPORARY PRAGMATISM 416, 419 (2017) (“Dahl . . . understood 
pluralism as the aggregation of citizens’ interests through diverse political parties and interest groups, 
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Pluralism encourages a representative democracy. Representative 
democracy is a system where “citizens elect candidates periodically in order 
to represent them in institutions and make decisions on their behalf.”99 
While in office, elected officials are not meant to propose their own interests 
that counter the interests of the people they represent; their role is to actively 
participante in discovering what solutions will best accommodate the 
interests of their constituents.100 In this way, “[g]overnment tends to be 
depicted as a mechanism for mediating and compromising a constantly 
shifting balance between group interests rather than as an active innovator 
or imposer of policies upon society.”101  
Pluralist theory stresses that interest group competition and its 
supervision by the government is beneficial for the country for three main 
reasons.102 First, interest group conflict manifests as debate between groups 
in the political process instead of as outright hostility between the groups.103 
Second, competition among the interest groups results in all of the groups 
achieving their goals, even if incrementally.104 Finally, allowing the 
government to stand in a supervisory role helps to ensure that the 
competition between the groups results in an outcome that is beneficial for 
society as a whole.105  
The pluralist framework provides an explanation of the conditions that 
allow a democracy to function effectively and that prevent tyrannical 
government. Using this framework, this note will look at two cases that 
analyze government social media accounts under opposite approaches in 
order to determine which approach is better suited to the goals of 
representative democracy.  
  
 
 
so that democracy features multiple centres of power and counters authoritarianism.”).  
99.  Id.  
100. Paul M. Johnson, Pluralist theory, A GLOSSARY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY TERMS (Auburn 
University Department of Political Science 2005), 
http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/pluralist_theory [https://perma.cc/9J4L-NJW7]. 
101.  Id. 
102.  BARKAN, supra note 95, at 519. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss1/7
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II. CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS’ SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS: PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS V. 
GOVERNMENT SPEECH ANALYSIS  
A. Twitter Analyzed as a Public Forum: Knight First Amendment Institute 
v. Trump 
Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump106 arose when seven 
individual Twitter users107 separately tweeted messages that were critical of 
President Trump and his policies in response to a tweet from the 
@realDonaldTrump account.108 The @realDonaldTrump account is 
President Donald Trump’s Twitter account.109 President Trump established 
the account in March of 2009 as a private citizen, but he continued to use 
the account after his inauguration and throughout his presidency.110 After 
each of the individual plaintiffs’ tweeted at the President’s account, they 
were subsequently blocked.111 The government112 did not contest the 
allegations that these individuals were blocked because their tweets were 
critical of President Trump.113 The government instead argued that it was 
completely permissible for President Trump, Daniel Scavino (the White 
House Director of Social Media), and two other White House staff members 
to do so because President Trump used the Twitter account as his personal 
government speech account, a space where First Amendment protections do 
not apply and where he can eliminate speech if he so chooses.114 The 
plaintiffs argued that because the President uses this account for official 
government purposes, the First Amendment requires that portions of the 
@realDonaldTrump account be analyzed under the public forum doctrine 
developed by the Supreme Court.115 Plaintiffs argued that under the public 
forum doctrine, the President blocking their individual accounts is 
 
 
106. Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019) (Knight II).  
107. Individual plaintiffs included Rebecca Buckwalter, Philip Cohen, Holly Figueroa, Eugene 
Gu, Brandon Neely, Joseph Papp, and Nicholas Pappas.  
108. Knight II, 928 F.3d at 233.  
109. Id. at 231.  
110. Id.  
111. Id. at 233.  
112. The plaintiffs and the Knight Institute sued Donald Trump, Daniel Scavino (the White 
House Director of Social Media), and two other White House staff members as the ones responsible for 
blocking their accounts. The government as used in this section will refer to those named individuals. 
Id. at 233. 
113. Id. at 232.  
114. Id. at 234.  
115. Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(Knight I). 
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viewpoint discrimination and violates the First Amendment.116 
This note will primarily utilize the analysis of the district court, as this 
is the level at which a majority of the significant factual determinations 
regarding public forum analysis were made. Significantly, these 
determinations were all affirmed on appeal by the Second Circuit.117 The 
trial judge determined that the interactive spaces on Twitter, a private social 
media platform, could be analyzed under the First Amendment as a public 
forum.118 The district court began by assessing which portions of the 
account could be subjected to forum analysis.119 The district court stated, 
“[p]laintiffs do not seek access to the account as a whole—they do not desire 
the ability to send tweets as the President, the ability to receive notifications 
that the President would receive, or the ability to decide who the President 
follows on Twitter.”120 The district court determined that the forum doctrine 
could only be applied to the specific aspects of the account that the speakers 
sought access to including: (1) “the content of the tweets,” (2) “the timeline 
comprised of the account’s tweets,” and (3) “the interactive space of each 
tweet[,]” where users reply, retweet, or like individual tweets.121 
The district court next looked at the purpose, structure, and intended use 
of the relevant aspects of the @realDonaldTrump account: (1) “the content 
of the tweets,” (2) “the timeline comprised of the account’s tweets,” and (3) 
“the interactive space of each tweet.”122 First, the district court looked at the 
content of the @realDonaldTrump account tweets.123 The district court 
determined that the content of the tweets were properly analyzed under the 
government speech doctrine because they come from the President or other 
government officials who are delivering the President’s message.124 
Therefore, the content of the President’s tweets are not susceptible to forum 
analysis; they are a form of government speech that is not subject to First 
Amendment restrictions.125 Second, the district court also found that the 
@realDonaldTrump account’s timeline was properly analyzed under the 
 
 
116. Knight I, 302 F. Supp. at 550.  
117. See generally, Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019) 
(Knight II).  
118. Knight I, 302 F. Supp. at 566-67. 
119. Id. at 565.  
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 566. 
122. Id. at 570. On appeal, both parties conceded that the President’s tweets were properly 
analyzed under the government speech doctrine, and therefore the Second Circuit did not address this 
issue in depth. Knight II, 928 F.3d at 239.  
123. Id. at 571.  
124.  Id. 
125.  Id. 
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government speech doctrine, not public forum analysis, because the 
timeline simply aggregated all of the President’s tweets, all of which were 
government speech.126 
However, when it came to analyzing “the interactive space for replies 
and retweets” created by each of the President’s tweets, the district court 
determined that this space was not properly analyzed under the government 
speech doctrine.127 The tweets in the interactive space are associated with 
the replying user, not with the initial user who sent the tweet.128 The district 
court noted that the user who generates the replies does not maintain control 
over them at any point, and the replies are not likely to be closely identified 
with the sender of the tweet even if the sender is a government official.129 
Upon an evaluation of these factors, the district court concluded that the 
interactive space for replies and retweets that is created with each of the 
President’s tweets is properly analyzed under the Supreme Court’s public 
forum precedents.130  
As the interactive space that the plaintiffs were trying to access was 
created by tweets from the @realDonaldTrump account (the personal 
account he used prior to his election), instead of the official @POTUS 
account, the Second Circuit needed to determine that the interactive space 
was government owned or controlled in order for the space to be subject to 
the limitations of the First Amendment.131 The Second Circuit began by 
stating, “[t]he government’s contention that the President’s use of the 
Account during his presidency is private founders in the face of the 
uncontested evidence in the record of substantial and pervasive government 
involvement with, and control over, the Account.”132 The Second Circuit 
noted that since the President was inaugurated, he has used the 
@realDonaldTrump account, with the assistance of the White House Social 
Media Director, Daniel Scavino, to:  
[A]nnounce, describe, and defend his policies; to promote his 
 
 
126.  Knight II, supra note 117, at 572.  
127.  Id.  
128.  Id.  
129.  Id. 
[A]s to replies, they . . . appear[] most prominently in the timeline of the replying user . . . 
replying tweets are ‘controlled by the user who generates them’ . . . the reply is unlikely to be 
‘closely identified in the public mind’ with the sender . . . [a]nd, far from ‘maintaining direct 
control over the messages conveyed’ in a user’s replies . . . the government maintains no control 
over the content of the reply.  
130. Knight II, supra note 117, at 573.  
131.  Id. at 234-35.  
132.  Id. at 235.  
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Administration’s legislative agenda; to announce official decisions; 
to engage with foreign political leaders; to publicize state visits; [and] 
to challenge media organizations whose coverage of his 
Administration he believes to be unfair. . .133 
The Second Circuit highlighted a number of factors that supported a 
finding that the interactive space was government controlled.134 First, the 
court noted that the account is described by the President and the White 
House Staff as “belonging to, and operated by, the President.”135 Second, 
the court recognized that since becoming President, President Trump has 
used the account on almost a daily basis “as a channel for communicating 
and interacting with the public about his administration” and has used the 
account to announce “matters related to official government business,” 
including “high-level White House and cabinet-level staff changes” as well 
as "changes to major national policies.”136 Finally, the Second Circuit 
concluded that because the President acts in an official capacity when he 
tweets, he acts in the same capacity when be blocks those who disagree with 
him.137 Therefore, the Second Circuit found that the President excluded the 
named plaintiffs from a government-controlled property when he blocked 
them from his Account.138 
The Second Circuit determined that the account was “intentionally 
opened up for public discussion,” it was used as “an official vehicle for 
governance,” and its interactive features were made “accessible to the 
public without limitation.”139 These factors indicated that the space was in 
fact a public forum.140 Additionally, the Second Circuit went on to find that 
because the President was a government actor when using his account, the 
blocking was viewpoint discrimination by the government that was 
prohibited by the First Amendment.141 The Second Circuit held that the 
 
 
133.  Id. at 231. 
134.  Id. at 235-36.  
135.  Knight II, supra note 117,  at 235. On this point, the court noted that the President described 
his use of the account as “MODERN DAY PRESIDENTIAL,” the White House social media director 
described the account as a channel through which “President Donald J. Trump . . . [c]ommunicat[es] 
directly with you, the American people!” and that the @WhiteHouse account directs users to follow both 
the @POTUS account and the @realDonaldTrump account. In addition, the court noted that the National 
Archives and Records Administration has determined that tweets from the @realDonaldTrump account 
“are official records that must be preserved under the Presidential Records Act.” Id.  
136.  Knight II, supra note 117, at 235-36.  
137.  Id. at 236.  
138.  Id.  
139.  Id. at 237.  
140.  Id.  
141.  Knight II, supra note 117, at 237-38.  
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President violated the First Amendment when he blocked the individual 
plaintiffs due to their disfavored speech.142  
The district court, and subsequently the Second Circuit, recognized that 
citizens use the interactive space created by each of the President’s tweets 
to discuss the President’s policies with the government and other citizens.143 
The Second Circuit noted that the President uses this space as a forum for 
interacting with citizens, highlighting that the President uses the “like,” 
“retweet,” and “reply” features of the Account to “understand and to 
evaluate the public’s reaction to what he says and does.”144 This view aligns 
with pluralism’s focus on allowing interest groups to compete with one 
another in the public sphere to evaluate which policies the public believes 
the government should pursue. Pluralism supports utilizing this interactive 
space as a public forum because the interactive space enables various 
interest groups to directly respond to their representatives’ policies. Citizens 
may react to the policies put forth by their representatives, and those 
representatives have exposure to the reactions their policies generate. The 
exposure to those reactions enables the representatives to respond in a way 
that reflects the will of the people.  
While the district court and the Second Circuit found that aspects of a 
governmental social media account could properly be analyzed as a public 
forum and that blocking users constituted impermissible viewpoint-based 
discrimination in this case, not every court that has considered these 
questions has reached the same conclusions.145 Other courts have analyzed 
government social media accounts as spaces for government speech – 
spaces where viewpoint discrimination is permissible.146 The following 
section discusses one of those cases and provides an explanation of how 
another court arrived at the opposite conclusion as Knight First Amendment 
Institute.  
B. Twitter Analyzed as a Private Account: Morgan v. Bevin  
In Morgan v. Bevin,147 a district court in Kentucky took an alternative 
approach to analyzing a government social media account. This court 
 
 
142.  Id. at 239.  
143.  Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(Knight I); see generally, Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 233-34 (2d Cir. 2019) 
(Knight II).  
144.  Knight II, 302 F.3d at 236. 
145. BRANNON, supra note 10, at 3.  
146.  Id. 
147.  Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1006 (E.D. Ky. 2018). 
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determined that the Governor of Kentucky’s Facebook and Twitter accounts 
were not subject to a public forum analysis; this court analyzed these spaces 
under the government speech analysis, an analysis that concludes with 
acceptance of viewpoint discrimination.148 In this case, Matt Bevin, the 
Governor of Kentucky, blocked Drew Morgan, a citizen of Kentucky, on 
Twitter after Morgan made comments about Governor Bevin’s overdue 
property taxes.149 Plaintiff alleged that Governor Bevin had violated his 
First Amendment rights because he was unable to view the posts and replies 
of other Twitter users.150 The court highlighted that Governor Bevin limited 
the subjects for discussion on his pages by posting a description that stated 
that comments should be used “to hear from the public on Facebook and 
Twitter” and additionally noted that “[o]n-topic comments provide 
Governor Bevin and his staff with quick, valuable feedback pertaining to 
the topics at issue.”151 Governor Bevin argued that off-topic comments 
divert the public’s attention from the subjects he chooses to discuss and 
prevent him from effectively engaging with the individuals who want to 
discuss relevant conversation topics.152 The court gave weight to the 
Governor’s statement that he “blocks both positive and negative comments 
that are off topic.”153  
To determine whether Governor Bevin was a state actor restricting 
speech in a public space, where First Amendment protections would apply, 
the court needed to determine what type of space was at issue.154 Plaintiffs 
argued that Facebook and Twitter are traditional public forums and should 
be subject to exacting scrutiny.155 Governor Bevin argued that his social 
media sites were limited forums because he had limited the content on the 
pages to “on-topic comments” relating to the topics he discussed on the 
page.156 He argued that because his social media sites were limited forums, 
restricting speech based on its content was acceptable as long as it was 
reasonable “in light of the purpose of the forum” and viewpoint neutral.157 
 
 
148.  Id. at 1010-11.  
149.  Id. at 1006. Additionally, Mary Hargis, another Kentucky citizen, sued Governor Bevin 
for blocking her on Facebook after criticizing his right-to-work policies.  
150.  Morgan, supra note 147, at 1006.  
151. Id.  
152.  Id.  
153.  Id.  
154.  Morgan, supra note 147, at 1010; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) (“The existence of a right of access to public property and the standard 
by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the 
property at issue.”). 
155.  Morgan, supra note 147, at 1010.  
156. Id. at 1008-10.  
157. Id.  
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While Governor Bevin appeared to have a strong argument that he 
prescribed limitations for the content of the forum, the court was cautious 
to apply a forum analysis to Twitter.158 The court seemed hesitant to apply 
the forum doctrine to a new space, highlighting Supreme Court guidance 
stating “[h]aving first arisen in the context of streets and parks, the public 
forum doctrine should not be extended in a mechanical way.”159  
The court noted that Governor Bevin did not intend for his accounts to 
be used by the public.160 Instead, he wanted to use the account to 
“communicate his vision, policies, and activities to constituents, and receive 
feedback from them on specific topics that he chooses to address in his 
posts.”161 The court concluded that because allowing anyone to access and 
post on Governor Bevin’s accounts would shut them down due to 
overcrowding, applying forum analysis to these accounts was 
inappropriate.162 The court instead viewed Governor Bevin’s use of his 
privately owned Facebook and Twitter profiles as personal accounts, not 
governmental accounts.163 In the court’s view, Governor Bevin was 
speaking on his own behalf, and these spaces were properly analyzed under 
the government-speech doctrine, not a public forum analysis.164 As the 
government speech doctrine allows viewpoint-based restrictions, Governor 
Bevin was allowed to block citizens from his personal page.165  
The Kentucky district court’s reasoning directly contradicts the ideals 
of pluralism. As he stated himself, Governor Bevin wanted to use this space 
to “communicate his vision, policies, and activities to constituents and to 
receive feedback from them on specific topics that he chooses to address in 
his posts.”166 Under a pluralist framework, a representative who opens up a 
space to hear feedback from his constituents should hear the feedback from 
all interest groups in the constituency. The court’s application of the 
government speech doctrine, however, allows this representative to silence 
the voices of constituents that he subjectively believes are “off-topic.” A 
 
 
158.  Id.  
159.  Morgan, supra note 147, at 1010 (citing Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 
523 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998)). 
160.  Morgan, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1011.  
161.  Id. at 1011. Here, “constituents” refers to the citizens of Kentucky, whom Governor Bevin 
represents, as opposed to the American public, whom Donald Trump represents.  
162.  Id. at 1012 (“Hypothetically, if this Court rules Governor Bevin could not block anyone 
from his Twitter or Facebook accounts, his accounts could be flooded with internet spam such that the 
purpose of conveying his message to his constituents would effectively, or actually, be closed.”).  
163.  Id.  
164.  Id. at 1010-11.  
165.  Morgan, supra note 147, at 1010-11. 
166.  Id.  
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representative democracy cannot function effectively if representatives are 
able to cut portions of the citizenry out of the discussion. Therefore, 
pluralism supports a determination that interactive spaces on government 
social media accounts are public forums, not government speech, because a 
public forum analysis will allow all interest groups to reach their 
representatives and, in turn, allow America’s representative democracy to 
function effectively. 
III. ARGUMENT FOR THE ANALYSIS OF INTERACTIVE SPACES ON 
GOVERNMENT SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS AS PUBLIC FORUMS  
A. Supreme Court Precedent Supporting Public Forum Analysis of 
Government Social Media Accounts  
Both Supreme Court precedent and pluralist ideology support a public 
forum analysis of the interactive spaces of government social media 
accounts. While the Supreme Court has yet to address this specific issue, 
past precedent and dicta have laid a framework that supports the conclusion 
that these spaces should be subject to forum analysis. Justice Kennedy has 
noted in a concurrence that identifying and protecting new spaces for public 
discourse is essential for preserving the marketplace of ideas, stating that 
“our public forum doctrine must recognize this reality, and allow the 
creation of public forums that do not fit within the narrow tradition of 
streets, sidewalks, and parks.”167 Justice Kennedy continued to argue that 
“our failure to recognize the possibility that new types of government 
property may be appropriate forums for speech will lead to a serious 
curtailment of our expressive activity.”168 He concluded by presenting a 
framework for subjecting new spaces to forum analysis: “[i]f the objective, 
physical characteristics of the property at issue and the actual public access 
and uses that have been permitted by the government indicate that 
expressive activity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses, 
the property is a public forum.”169 Although Justice Kennedy’s language 
lacks precedential value, his support for an open-minded approach to the 
range of forum analysis provides a strong argument that courts need to be 
open to subjecting new spaces to forum analysis or they risk a serious 
curtailment of expressive activity. Justice Kennedy’s language informs that 
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(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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public that even if these new spaces do not conform to Americans’ common 
perceptions of what a typical public forum looks like, the risk that free 
speech is hampered by a failure to recognize the modern day public forums 
is a risk we should take seriously. 
Although interactive spaces on social media are not “physical forums” 
in the way that parks and sidewalks are, the Supreme Court has been open 
to subjecting non-physical spaces to a forum analysis. In Rosenberger v. 
Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,170 the Supreme Court struck 
down a government regulation after applying forum analysis to a non-
physical forum.171 In Rosenberger, the Court found that a Student Activities 
Fund providing funding for various student organizations is “a forum more 
in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same 
principles are applicable.”172 The Court determined that a Student Activities 
Fund constituted a limited public forum and that a guideline that prevented 
student groups from receiving funding for any religious editorial viewpoints 
was viewpoint discrimination.173 The Court stated “[d]iscrimination against 
speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”174  
The Rosenberger holding laid a foundation for finding that the 
government could be limited in how they regulate a non-physical forum. 
The Court’s awareness that a non-physical forum could create a space where 
it was important to prevent exclusion of diverse viewpoints suggests that 
the Court’s ideology is in line with the pluralist perspective. This holding 
demonstrates that the Court understands the importance of equality of 
opportunity and the importance of enabling a wide variety of speakers to 
have their voices heard. Finally, this holding suggests that spaces on the 
Internet, another non-physical forum, might be suited to this line of analysis 
as well. 
One of the first Supreme Court cases to address the Internet was Reno 
v. ACLU.175 The Supreme Court struck down portions of the 
Communications Decency Act due to overbroad provisions that amounted 
to content-based restrictions of protected free speech.176 The Court provided 
insight into its understanding of how the meta-physical space on the Internet 
would be evaluated. Justice Stevens in his majority opinion noted that there 
 
 
170.  Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
171.  Id. at 837.  
172.  Id. at 830.  
173.  See generally, id. at 819.  
174.  Id. at 828.  
175.  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  
176.  Id. at 845, 868.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
 
108 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 12:1 
 
 
 
 
were “vast democratic forums of the Internet”177 and “[i]t is ‘no 
exaggeration to conclude that the content on the Internet is as diverse as 
human thought.’”178 Reno provided the framework for how the Court would 
address questions that arose from regulation of the Internet. Based on the 
language used, the Court viewed the Internet as a marketplace of ideas and 
supports the Internet’s facilitation of large volumes of expressive activity.  
The most recent Supreme Court commentaries on public forums and 
social media come from Matal v. Tam179 and Packingham v. North 
Carolina.180 In Matal v. Tam, the Court considered whether the publication 
of a trademarked term on the Federal Register could be considered a limited 
public forum.181 The Court stated that “[w]hen government creates such a 
forum, in either a literal or ‘metaphysical’ sense . . . some content-and 
speaker-based restrictions may be allowed . . . . However, even in such 
cases, what we have termed ‘viewpoint discrimination’ is forbidden.”182 The 
Court seems to understand pluralist ideology, recognizing that silencing 
interest groups based on their viewpoint is counterproductive to a 
representative democracy. This statement provided guidance informing 
lower courts that even if a space is the least protected type of forum, 
viewpoint discrimination is unacceptable. 
In Packingham v. North Carolina, an individual convicted of a sex 
crime argued that a North Carolina law prohibiting registered sex offenders 
from accessing social media websites violated the First Amendment.183 The 
Court began by noting that “[a] fundamental principle of the First 
Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they can speak 
and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more. The Court 
has sought to protect the right to speak in this spatial context.”184 The 
Supreme Court went on to state that while in the past it was difficult to 
identify the most important spaces for the exchange of views, it was clear 
now that cyberspace in general, and particularly social media, were essential 
spaces for speech.185 Justice Kennedy described social media as “the 
modern public square” and stated that social media is one of the most 
 
 
177.  Reno, supra note 175, at 868.  
178.  Id. at 852 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).  
179.  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017). 
180.  Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).  
181.  Matal, supra note 179, at 1763.  
182.  Id. 
183.  Packingham, supra note 180, at 1734.  
184.  Id. at 1735.  
185.  Packingham, supra note 180. 
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important places for the exchange of views.186 The Court cited Reno to note 
that “social media users employ these websites to engage in a wide variety 
of protected First Amendment topics ‘as diverse as human thought.’”187 The 
Court’s unanimous decision struck down the North Carolina law for 
violating the First Amendment because it “bars access to what for many are 
the principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for 
employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square . . . [and] 
provid[ing] perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private 
citizen to make his or her voice heard.”188 The Court’s framing in 
Packingham presents clear evidence of the value the Court places in the 
broad exchange of ideas that occurs on social media websites. Specifically, 
the language describing social media as “the modern public square” 
provides a strong foundation for an argument that interactive spaces on 
social media websites are properly analyzed under the Court’s public forum 
precedent.  
B. Pluralist Theory of Representative Democracy Supporting Public 
Forum Analysis of Government Social Media Accounts  
Pluralist theory of representative democracy supports subjecting 
portions of government social media accounts to forum analysis. Public 
forum analysis of the interactive space on these accounts allows competing 
interest groups to have equal access to the government and prevents 
government suppression of the interests of the citizenry.189 Public forum 
analysis ensures that government actors remain in the role of impartial 
arbiters instead of the role of active advocates of their own agendas who 
silence the voices of groups they disagree with.190 Pluralist democracy 
theory stresses that it is important for the government to serve in a 
managerial role, to actively listen to the various interest groups and attempt 
to form compromises that best suit the needs of the citizenry.191 A pluralist 
democracy cannot function effectively if the government is able to create an 
echo chamber where they choose not to hear from significant interest groups 
within their citizenry.192  
The pluralist framework supports a public forum analysis of 
 
 
186.  Id. at 1737.  
187.  Id. at 1735-36 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997)). 
188.  Id. at 1737.  
189.  Johnson, supra note 100. 
190.  Escobar, supra note 98, at 419. 
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government officials’ social media accounts for three main reasons. First, it 
allows political power to be spread among multiple, diverse interest groups 
and allows each of these groups to have access to their representative.193 
Second, a public forum analysis prevents the government from silencing 
political dissidents. Finally, a pluralist framework allows competition 
among the interest groups, and this competition is more likely to produce 
moderate, multi-faceted policies.194  
Public forum analysis of government social media accounts enables the 
wide variety of interest groups to access and directly respond to their 
representatives’ policies. Under a pluralist view of democracy, each interest 
group has an equal opportunity to inform its representative of its positions 
on its representative’s policies.195 The interactive spaces on social media 
sites allow elected representatives to actively engage with a wide variety of 
their constituents’ interest groups and to make policy choices that serve as 
compromises. A 2015 study of Congress’ interactions with social media, 
known as #SocialCongress 2015, noted:  
Prior to the introduction of the Internet, the process of engaging with 
elected officials was viewed as cumbersome and intimidating, 
perhaps only available to wealthy campaign donors. And prior to 
social media, email interactions with lawmakers were viewed by 
many as formal and robotic . . . . Yet social media is different, and is 
affecting the democratic dialogue in unexpected ways. The 
authenticity of a tweet or Facebook post, whether by a citizen or 
lawmaker, has the inescapable power to change minds.196  
While it is true that not every elected representative will actually take the 
time to listen to each of the interest groups, there is a significant interest in 
having a system that enables listening.  
A government speech analysis would allow representatives to block 
interest groups from the discussion. This means that each interest group 
would not have an equal opportunity to engage with its elected 
representative. On the other hand, a public forum analysis would force 
elected representatives to allow a variety of interest groups into the space 
and give each interest group an equal opportunity to get the attention of its 
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Management Foundation, 2015), 
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representatives. 
Second, public forum analysis prevents representatives from silencing 
political dissidents and therefore works against authoritarian tendencies.197 
In a pluralist democracy, public officials create compromises after hearing 
the interests of the people they represent, and this means keeping in mind 
the voices of dissidents who may object to an official’s course of action.198 
The #SocialCongress 2015 study noted that: 
Perhaps the most surprising and significant finding is how a relatively 
few number of citizens can affect Congress using social media. 
Eighty percent of congressional staff responding to these surveys 
noted that less than 30 posts to their office’s social media platform 
would cause them to ‘pay attention.’ . . . Members of Congress, staff, 
and professional advocates (i.e., lobbyists) know full well that a small 
number of people, strategically positioned to engage a legislator, can 
make a difference.199 
This study suggests that even a small number of citizens devoted to 
changing a public official’s mind can get their elected representative to pay 
attention. If politicians are able to block groups whose interests they 
disagree with, those interests are entirely excluded from the pool. This type 
of behavior is characteristic of authoritarian governments, which often 
silence political dissidents on the internet in order to consolidate power. For 
example, the Chinese government is known for blocking words, phrases, 
and pictures on social media that serve to commemorate the Tiananmen 
Square massacre to avoid political dissent.200 Allowing these small groups 
to have access to the interactive space makes the public official pay attention 
to the backlash and tailor policies in a way that will minimize it. Even if 
political dissidents are not able to get what they want, they can achieve their 
goals to some degree and, at a minimum, make their representatives aware 
that they disapprove of their representatives’ choices. A public forum 
analysis enables a pluralist system in which elected representatives listen to 
 
 
197.  Escobar, supra note 98, at 419. 
198.  Johnson, supra note 100. 
199.  Fitch & Goldschmidt, supra note 196, at 7.  
200.  Cate Cadell, China’s Internet Censors are on High Alert Ahead of the Anniversary of the 
Tiananmen Square Protests, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 26, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/china-censorship-tiananmen-square-protests-2019-5 
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all of their constituents and prevents an authoritarian system in which the 
government can silence political dissidents.201 
Finally, public forum analysis ensures that the competition between 
interest groups benefits society as a whole. A public forum analysis enables 
politicians to take all ideas from their constituents into account and pick 
those that they think are best to implement, a system that pluralists believe 
improves society. The #SocialCongress 2015 study found that only 3% of 
representatives answered, “We don’t review comments,” which indicates 
that the other 97% do review social media comments to some extent.202 
Even if a politician is biased towards certain types of policies, exposure to 
alternative ideas is essential. A government speech analysis of these spaces 
would allow a representative to entirely eliminate the advocates of 
alternative policies. Government social media accounts are one of the most 
accessible resources for many citizens to propose policies to their 
representatives. Eliminating interest groups from these spaces has the 
potential to stifle policy that benefits large portions of the citizenry.203 
The #SocialCongress 2015 study stated,  
[d]espite overwhelming cynicism as to whether Congress ‘listens’ to 
citizens, this finding supports previous CMF research indicating that 
constituents can have an impact on lawmakers’ decisions . . . [T]his 
finding could help reaffirm citizens’ trust in their democratic 
institutions, knowing that their elected officials care about what they 
think.204  
A system that at least places government officials in a position where 
they have access to the ideas of a large number of interest groups is more 
likely to lead to well-informed and tailored policies.  
CONCLUSION 
Pluralist theory coupled with precedent and dicta from the Supreme 
Court provides a strong basis for the argument that the interactive spaces 
created by government social media accounts should be analyzed as public 
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forums. Social media has truly become the “modern public square,” and 
these interactive spaces are the prime locations for political discussion. 
These spaces are unique because they provide citizens with the ability to 
instantaneously engage with their elected representatives directly. The 
discussions on these platforms are vital First Amendment speech that should 
be vigorously protected.  
Previous Supreme Court precedent noted that in government-controlled 
spaces where expressive activity flourishes, regulation of content and 
viewpoint should be very limited. Supreme Court dicta suggests that a meta-
physical forum should be analyzed under public forum analysis when the 
characteristics of the property and the actual public access permitted by the 
government indicate that expressive activity would be appropriate and 
compatible with the space. When a government official creates a social 
media account for the purpose of communicating with their constituents 
about their policies, it is clear that a government-controlled space has been 
opened for expressive activity.  
One of the core concepts of free speech is that the government should 
not be able to restrict speech based on its content or viewpoint.205 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Packingham v. North Carolina suggest that 
when a government official blocks someone from their social media 
account, they are doing it because of the content or viewpoint of their 
speech. President Trump admitted that he blocked particular individuals 
because he did not like what they had to say.206 Congresswoman Alexandra 
Ocasio-Cortez is also facing lawsuits for blocking individuals who were 
critical of her views.207 This kind of viewpoint-based exclusion is exactly 
what the First Amendment and public forum analysis are meant to restrict. 
The goal of public forum analysis is to prevent the government from 
silencing the voices of political dissidents in spaces that are open for public 
debate and expression.208  
Social media has proved to be a prime candidate for the application of 
public forum principles to protect that goal. While the Supreme Court would 
need to consider whether each social media site could be considered a 
 
 
205.  Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828-29 (1995).  
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designated, limited, or nonpublic forum, in any situation, government 
officials blocking individuals from these spaces based on their viewpoint 
should be presumed to be unconstitutional. As viewpoint discrimination is 
unconstitutional regardless of the type of forum, the sole requirement is that 
a court determine that there is sufficient government control of a space that 
has been opened for public expression.  
Additionally, pluralist theory suggests that a public forum analysis, as 
opposed to a government speech analysis, is the approach that aligns with 
our concepts of a pluralist, representative democracy and the role of the 
government as a mediator. Pluralist theory tells us that the government is 
intended to enact compromises based on the competing concerns of the 
various interest groups that make up our country. The government is 
intended to engage with the democratic process by listening to the needs of 
all interest groups and creating a solution that benefits as much of the 
citizenry as possible. Significantly, the #SocialCongress 2015 study 
suggested that lawmakers use social media for this very purpose.209 If 
government social media accounts are analyzed as government speech, the 
government cannot properly fulfill this role. The government speech 
doctrine allows the government to discriminate based on viewpoint and 
reject speech it does not agree with. This means that, on their social media 
accounts, government officials are able to eliminate political dissidents from 
access to officials’ accounts solely because of dissidents’ viewpoints. If this 
were the case, the government would be acting as more of an advocate of 
its own agenda within the political system, creating a space for it to 
promulgate its own ideas, receiving input from only those that agree with it, 
and silencing those that don’t agree with it. This system resembles an 
authoritative government, not a pluralist democracy.  
Public forum analysis allows the government to serve its intended role 
in a pluralist democracy. Public forum analysis forces politicians to receive 
input from a wide range of interest groups and to access all of ideas of the 
citizens they are intended to represent. Politicians should be restricted in 
who they may eliminate from the forum and limited in reasons they may use 
to eliminate them. If the government is to remain in its role as a mediator in 
our pluralist, representative democracy, it must abstain from acting as an 
advocate and engaging in authoritarian tendencies. Instead, our pluralist 
democracy flourishes in a system that allows free and open debate of ideas 
and interests in our modern public forums.
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